This paper studies the choice of electoral rules, in particular the question of minority representation. Majorities tend to disenfranchise minorities through strategic manipulation of electoral rules. With the aim of explaining changes in electoral rules adopted by US cities, particularly in the South, we show why majorities tend to adopt "winner-take-all" city-wide rules (at-large elections) in response to an increase in the size of the minority when the minority they are facing is relatively small. In this case, for the majority it is more e ective to leverage on its sheer size instead of risking to concede representation to voters from minority-elected districts.
Introduction
The Voting Rights Act (VRA) of 1965 was meant to protect the right to vote for racial minorities especially in the South. In fact in a reasonably short time it resulted in a massive reinfranchisement of black voters through an unprecedented e ort of voter registration. White majorities in cities of the South reacted strategically to this federal legislation by changing the electoral rules of their cities in order to minimize minority representation. They only partially succeeded. Had they not been kept in check by judicial intervention, they would have engaged in even more openly strategic manipulation of rules. This paper presents evidence of such strategic manipulation both around the time of introduction of the VRA and in the after-VRA period.
The two traditional voting rules in American cities are at-large elections, where the majority at the city level elects the representatives on the city council, and district systems, where representatives are chosen in districts or local wards. Proportional representation systems were tried earlier in the past century and then discarded precisely because they favored minority representation (racial and left wing/socialist) too much. 1 In this paper we show (in theory and then empirically) that white majorities expecting an increase in black votes after the Voting Right Act adopted at-large electoral rules when the black minority in the city was relatively small in order to win all seats.
However, if the minority share was larger (closer to a fifty-fifty split), the possibility of losing the whole city induced the white majority to confine black votes in minority-packed districts and single-member district: electoral rules serve this purpose. 2 This paper provides a "positive" model of choice of electoral rules. We do not study how rules should be chosen behind a veil of ignorance to maximize social welfare, but we study how a majority knowing that it may remain such or face a chance of loosing would choose rules in its favor. Therefore the general point raised by this paper is that voting rules are hardly exogenous and are chosen strategically, while a vast literature has taken them as exogenous or predetermined and studied their e ects on policy choices 3 . In earlier work we had studied related issues in a 1 See for instance the discussion in Alesina and Glaeser (2004) and the references cited therein 2 Manipulation of electoral rules is not a prerogative exclusive of American cities. For a discussion of electoral rules and racial politics in elections in India see Pande (2003) . Alexander (2004, p.211 ) describes in detail the 1947 Gaullist manipulations of electoral rules in France. In the Paris area where the Gaullist alliance was weak they introduced proportional representation, in rural areas where the alliance was strong, they introduced plurality rule. Kreuzer (2004, p.229) describes strategic manipulation in Germany. One could go on. 3 For a discussion of the e ects of electoral rules taken as predetermined or exogenous see Lijphart (1994) and Persson and Tabellini (2003) for a sample of democratic countries and Baqir (2002) for a cross-section of US cities.
Alt and Lowry (1994), Poterba (1994) , and Bohn and Inman (1996) amongst others. Mulligan, Gil, and Sala-i-Martin cross sample of countries (Aghion, Alesina and Trebbi (2004) ). In the present paper we study U.S.
cities, which are an especially interesting case for three reasons. First, it is quite compelling to identify the "majority" with the whites and the "minority" with racial "minorities". 4 Second, the VRA o ers an ideal "experiment" of a change in legislation at the Federal Level which prompted strategic adaptation of local rules. Third, U.S. cities present substantial cross-sectional and time variation in their electoral rules.
This "positive" and strategic approach to models of voting rules is relatively recent and rare, 5 since most of the literature on constitutional choice of voting rules is normative, starting from the work of Hayek (1960) and Buchanan and Tullock (1962) 6 . A normative approach usually characterizes works in Political Science as well, with some notable exception such as Lipset and Rokkan (1967) , Riker (1986) and several essays in Colomer (2004) .
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a simple formal setup. Section 3 describes the institutional context of US city governments and introduces our data. Section 4 presents our empirical results. The last section concludes.
2 A model of the choice of electoral rules
Basic setup
There are two groups of voters in a city, whites ( ) and blacks ( ). The initial relative size of the blacks is 1 2 0 so that the size of the larger white group is (1 ) The whites are, initially at least, a majority and they are those who choose the electoral rule for the city (in short, we call the choice of the electoral rule the "constitution"). The population is equally spread over three (exogenously apportioned 7 ) electoral districts, numbered 1 2 3, each with individuals, and the city council consists of three seats. The initial number of black and white voters in each district are given by and for = 1 2 3 We assume that 1 = and
is a real number between 1 4 and 1 2 which insures that 0 1 2 since:
4 For discussion of the importance of race in American local politics, see for instance Hacker (1992) , Huckfeld and Kohfeld (1989) , Wilson (1996) and Alesina, Baqir, and Hoxby (2004). 5 Alesina and Glaeser (2004) discuss how the choice of alternative electoral rules, which are themselves associated with di erent policy choices over the welfare state, are indeed the result of strategic constitutional choices.See for instance the work of Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) on the origin of democratic institutions. 6 For a survey of the literature on Constitutional Theory, see Voigt (1997) . 7 The model will abstract from gerrymandering of the electoral districts and the vast literature on the matter. On gerrymandering, see Cox and Katz (2002) and Friedman and Holden (2005) .
The parameter is a shift term which allows to vary the initial number of black voters in a district and links the city-wide racial composition to the district-wide racial composition. The white majority chooses the electoral rule, through which a three-member council is elected. After the constitution is chosen, there is a shock to the composition of voters in the city, to which the electoral rule cannot be made contingent upon. 8 . More formally, during the interim phase (defined as the time span between the choice of electoral rule and the election of the council) an exogenously given mass of new black voters joins the polity, with = where is a random variable uniformly distributed between 0 and an upper bound (1 2) Half of the newcomers locate in district 2, and half in district 3
Di erent compositions of the council imply di erent policies, and therefore di erent ex post payo s for the white.
(resp. 0 and ) is the utility level of a white agent when there are no (resp. one and two) white representative(s) on the council. The ex ante expected utility of a white constitution writer can then be expressed as:
where denotes the probability that council representatives are white at the interim stage.
Thus, having some representation is better than having none at all 9 and that, in general, voters' preferences are increasing in their electoral representation. The electoral rule chosen by the white voters determines the value of 0 and 1 Summarizing: 1) The electoral rule is chosen by the white group; 2) New black voters join the polity and elections determine a given composition of the council; 3) Payo s realize.
Electoral rules and expected utilities
With an eye to the case of American cities, we now study two alternative electoral rules. The first one, "at-large" ( ), allocates all seats to the party which wins more than fifty percent of the votes of the entire city. The second rule, "single-member district rule" ( ), requires that each candidate runs in a particular district and obtains a majority of votes in that district. These are reasonable approximations of the electoral rules in US cities although details of electoral fomulae vary considerably across municipalities. Given our assumptions on the group composition of the three districts, 1 = 0 under the rule, and 0 = 0 with the rule. Under the at-large rule 8 See La ont (2000) and Aghion and Bolton (2003) for a detailed discussion of this "incomplete contract" approach to constitutions in political economy. 9 See Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) for a legislative model and an extensive discussion of this assumption and a comparison with alternatives.
the ex ante expected utility of constitution writers in the group is:
where = is the loss from losing the majority, and 0 = Pr( 1 + 4 ) is the probability of the white losing the majority under 10 . Substituting for as a function of in 0 using (1), the ex ante expected loss of the whites (relative to the bliss point ) under the rule, is equal
where we use the notation + = max{ 0} Under the rule council seats are allocated at the district level. The probability 1 of the blacks winning a majority of two seats is equal to the probability that districts 2 and 3 be won by the blacks. Then the ex ante utility of the whites under the single-member district rule, can be expressed as:
where = 0 is the constitution writers' loss from losing the majority. Substituting for in the probability 1 = Pr( 4 ) 11 and using (1), the ex ante expected loss of white constitution writers under the rule is equal to
The size of minorities and the choice of electoral rule
Ex ante at the constitutional stage, the whites choose the electoral rule that minimizes the expected loss If initially the whites command a very large majority of votes, the constitution writers do not fear they can lose the majority under either rule, thus they are indi erent between the two rules. As the relative size of the blacks increases, however, at some point it becomes preferable for the whites to move to in order to reduce the power of the black voters in districts 2 and 3 by confronting them with the whole pool of white voters, including those in district 1. Doing so allows the whites to preserve their majority in the council. When the fraction of blacks reaches the point that it becomes impossible to insure that for every realization of they might become the new majority, moving to the rule allows the whites to limit their possible losses: as becomes su ciently close to 1 2 , the risk of losing all three districts and thereby incurring the large loss makes the whites prefer a system. In fact guarantees the whites at least 1 seat on the council -and thereby limits their loss to , given that in this case black voters are restricted to commanding districts 2 and 3 only. More formally:
Proposition 1 (a) Both rules and involve no utility loss to whites when ¡ 0 Proof. In Appendix. Figure 1 represents graphically the loss functions and where 0 (resp. 0 ) is the size of the minority at which the expected loss under (resp. ) becomes positive.
N districts and mixed systems
We now consider two empirically relevant generalizations of the problem. 3 Institutional setting and data
The Voting Rights Act and its implementation
There was no constitutional protection for voting and electoral participation in the United States before the Civil War. 13 . See also Cole (1976) . 17 See the detailed discussion by Parker (1990) .
in di erent ways and there was much uncertainty about how each specific ruling would go given the complexity of the issues involved 18 . Because of all these disagreements in the lower courts, the Supreme Court in 1980 took on the Case of City of Mobile versus Bolden and established the need to prove discriminatory purposes when challenging a change in electoral rules 19 . The language of the majority opinion suggested very high standard of proof for active discrimination 20 . even stronger, since the white majority could have acted unconstrained.
Data and summary statistics
This section briefly reviews the main variables employed in the empirical analysis. We refer the reader to the separate Data Appendix 21 for details on variables definition, construction, and sources.
We gathered two sets of data: one including characteristics of city governments and their institutional details; the other including demographic, economic, and geographic characteristics of US cities. We collected information on US municipal governments characteristics for the period 1930- From the decade issues of the Bureau of the Census' of Population we collected information on total population, racial groups sizes, median household income, and geographic characteristics of Places and Minor Civil Divisions (MCD's) 24 . With regard to racial composition, from 1930 to 1970 the data available allow for a breakdown into three groups: white, black, and other races (we did not distinguish between foreign-born or native). From 1980 the Census allows for a more refined racial breakdown 25 . Since our empirical analysis runs from the thirties to the nineties, for 21 Due to space limitations we produce the Data Appendix in a separate document, available on request. Please refer to the authors' webpages for a downloadable version of the Data Appendix. 22 ICMA is a professional organization of city managers and administrators publishing local government data since 1914 and a recognized scholarly source. ICMA data have been employed in a number of papers, including Baqir where the e ect of the Voting Rights Act is more relevant and should show larger di erences before and after the mid-1960s. 24 Definitions and references in the Data Appendix. 25 In general the breakdown includes at least Whites, Blacks, Hispanics, Asians, Pacific Islanders, and Native
Americans.
consistency we used the three-groups breakdown (white, blacks, others) for the entire sample. Our 
Empirical results
We now focus on the main prediction of our model, namely that the preference of whites for at-large rules over single-member district increases and then decreases with the initial size of the minority group. This section reports four results. First, we present cross-sectional and panel evidence of our main prediction for US cities during the entire period after the enfranchisement of minority voters (the VRA). Second, we show the absence of a relationship between at-large and single-member district rules and the initial size of the minority group during the entire period before the VRA in the South. Third, we focus on the changes taking place around the VRA (immediately before and after the treatment). Fourth, we consider the evidence that an e ect of electoral rules on minority representation is present and operates according to the intuition of the model.
The choice of electoral rules
Empirical Strategy -The empirical strategy in Table 1 and in the majority of the following tables is a simple, yet flexible, linear (in the coe cients) parametric model of the choice of electoral rules.
For each city in year let us define the electoral rule variable, , the relative size of the non-white minority, a vector of ( x 1) controls in our baseline specification: the log of city population and median household income. We specify the following equation in levels:
for = 1 and = 1 . 26 We were also able to obtain the full lists of cities sampled from ICMA for the last survey in year 2001 and we verify the absence of any response selection in the survey; see the Data Appendix.
We perform our analysis both in a cross-section for given and in a two-way panel in which we account for unobserved, time-invariant heterogeneity at the city level and for time-specific e ects 27 . In the latter case we assume a two-way error component = + + Employing within-city variation allows us to account for unobserved heterogeneity and estimate consistently the vector = ( 1 2 ) Time-specific e ects are similarly useful in accounting for across-the-board e ects, such as federal legislation, that again need to be controlled for, especially in the post-1965 period when legislation was extremely active. We address the issue of serial correlation in the error component by relaxing the assumption of independence and clustering at the city level.
Conditional heteroskedasticity of unknown type is also accounted for in all standard errors both in the cross-section and the panel results.
Identification -The most likely source of reverse causation a ecting (2) is endogenous sorting across municipalities driven by more favorable electoral rules. However, Tiebout sorting would predict a correlation between changes in city racial composition and in electoral rules of the opposite sign to what predicted by our model, dampening the least squares estimates towards zero.
To see this, suppose that, given a small size of the minority, , a city changes its electoral rule in favor of white voters against black voters by decreasing the number of single-district seats on the council. In this case Tiebout sorting would predict a decrease in the size of the minority (blacks would leave the city and possibly more whites could join in), implying a positive correlation between the share of single-district seats and the size of the minority at small . Now suppose that, given a large size of the minority, , a city changes its electoral rule by increasing the number of singledistrict seats on the council. Under the basic setup of Proposition 1 this produces an unambiguous reduction of the expected utility of the blacks. Tiebout sorting would predict a decrease in the size of the minority (blacks would leave the city and possibly more whites could join in), implying a negative correlation between the share of single-district seats and the size of the minority at large . However, it is enough to move to our more general theoretical setup including risk aversion to see that moving towards single-member district at high may produce an increase in the utility of both groups. In this case Tiebout sorting could produce an overestimate of the true slope of the curve in the rightmost range of We address this potential endogeneity. by instrumenting the fraction of the minority with 10 years lags and geographic location (an indicator variable taking value 1 if the city is in the South). Distant lags and geographic location should be considered predetermined or exogenous (the case for South) and therefore valid instruments of current size of the minority. Exclusion restrictions can be tested given overidentification of the system. 27 Formal F-tests for this specification support the use of a two-way setup. Both groups of fixed e ects are jointly significant in every specification. Table 1 , presents the results concerning the main non-monotonicity. The Table refers to the sample of US cities 28 thus not rejecting the validity of the instruments set in terms of exclusion restrictions. It is a low value, however, given the low power properties of the test. The minimum for the shaped curve is estimated at 0 318 minority size.
Results -
In columns (4) and (5) we tackle the issue of unobserved heterogeneity at the city level in our baseline specification and in one where additional controls are added. For column (5) controls are the squared log of city population and median income. We obtain estimates of = ( 1 2 ) close to the 2SLS estimates and statistically significant at the 1 percent confidence level (both individually and jointly).
To gauge quantitatively the size of the two e ects in Table 1 , we can start from the empirical 28 As for all the rest of our empirical analysis we exclude from the sample those cities for which we have information that the change of structure of government is the result of court mandate or State Law. We also exclude cities below 2500 as the ICMA sample is representative of the US Census of Population places and MCD in this group. Similar results were obtained when employing the complete sample of municipalities or performing the cross-sectional analysis for the years 1980 and 2000. 29 Note that one may want to exclude cities in which whites are a minority. There are very few of those and in addition even when whites are a minority in terms of number of inhabitants, demographic factors and vote participation patterns may still make them a majority as active voters (see Amy 2002 for an example). For this reason it is unclear which cities to drop from the sample. We tried a few experiments and our results appear robust.
distribution of minorities in US cities in year 1990 for the cities in our sample 30 . The median (Q5)
for the fraction of minority is 5 5 percent and the ninth decile (Q9) is 34 3. At Q5, given estimated coe cients in column (4) of 0 622 and 1 078 (with robust standard errors respectively 0 202 and 0 284), an increase of one standard deviation of minority sizes (15 3 percent) implies a reduction of 5 3 percent of the fraction of single-district seats. This is equivalent to about 1 3 seat switching from single-member district to at-large in a council of 6 seats (the mean council size in the 1990 sample). At Q9, the same increase of one standard deviation would instead produce an increase of about +4 4 percent in the fraction of single-district seats. This would be equivalent to more than 1 4 seat switching from at-large to single-district in a council of 6 seats. The estimates are quantitatively reasonable, since the voting rights legislation over the years has imposed increasing limits on institutional changes.
We also separately run a battery of robustness checks that we do not report for parsimony of presentation First, we have considered a discrete version of our dependent variable, and found analogous evidence of the main non-monotonicity for both the cross-section and the panel (using conditional logit fixed e ects). Similarly we have considered a (two-sided) limited dependent variable (LDV) approach: a Tobit and IV Tobit estimator for columns (1)- (3) and a random e ects Tobit estimator grouping observations at the city level for columns (4)- (5). This is a way of incorporating the empirical feature that is constrained to be in [0 1]. The implications of Table 1 the cross-sectional regression of Table (1) using dummies by quintile of the minority population.
The coe cients on the dummies first decrease and then increase (at the fifth quintile) as expected (however only the decreasing portion of the U curve produces statistically significant contrasts).
Before the VRA
An important validation issue in the empirical strategy concerns the timing of the Voting Rights Act. We employ such date as an informative source of variation for institutional manipulation. Table 2 reproposes the specifications of columns (1) and (4) of Table 1 )) and the coe cients display changes of sign. This is consistent with our hypothesis that before the Voting Act electoral rules were una ected by the city racial composition, since racial minorities were almost completely disenfranchised.
The VRA
In this section we try to identify the e ect of the extension of the electoral franchise in the immediate aftermath of the VRA on the choice of electoral rules from the subsequent legal restrictions imposed on the choice of the electoral rules. A way of addressing this issue is to make appropriate use of the timing of the voting rights lawsuits and Supreme Court jurisprudence. Accordingly, Table   3 
The coe cients = ( 1 2 ) can be interpreted as a measure of the e ect of an increase in the relative size of racial minorities in the South on the electoral rules. 31 Median household income is not available before 1960, hence it is not included in specifications covering those years. 32 Allen vs. State Board of Election.
Estimates 33 of the gap between fractions of white and black registered voters decreased from 44 1 percent to 27 4 percent from 1965 to 1967, but with half the black population still disenfranchised.
In a city with 50 percent blacks in 1967 only 25 percent was voting, leaving whites 34 1 6 to 1. This means that our analysis will be particularly apt at capturing the e ects at low Table 3 presents the results. In the upper part of Table 3 we first report tabulations of all the within-city changes in electoral rules that identify (3) . By splitting the sample by electoral rule in 1960 we are able to detect two relevant facts: (i) in 1960 the majority of the cites in the South were ( 5), a remnant of the Progressive era; (ii) the bulk of the changes happened in cities where 5. Basically all Southern cities employing an rule kept it unchanged at the moment of the black enfranchisement and a vast majority of the cities moved towards
at-large in a way consistent with intuition and our model. If a city moves from zero voting minority (where the electoral rule is inconsequential) to , the only type of city that should change is the (initially) moving towards . The cities should not move unless is very large. It is therefore not surprising that our results will be especially strong concerning the movement towards Column (1) in the bottom part of Table 3 presents first-di erence estimates for the specification (3), where the fraction of the minority enters linearly at the 1960 level and in a quadratic form.
The estimated coe cient 1 presents the expected sign but not 2 and both are not statistically significant. In column (2) we run the same regression in the portion of the data containing the identifying information: the initially cities. Importantly the regression picks up both the linear and the quadratic e ects in a way consistent with the theory. Similarly to Section 4.1 we can calculate the e ect of an increase of one standard deviation of minority sizes (0 153). The e ects are 23 2 (at Q5) and +4 1 percent (at Q9) of the share of single-member seats. The negative e ect is around four times larger than in Table ( 1), confirming substantial pressure towards endogenous changes in the electoral rules. In column (3) we restrict to the set of initially cities. Here identification is due to a very small fraction of cities, the few changing, and we find a counterintuitive swap in coe cients signs and borderline significance for the t-tests. Notice however that these findings are countervailed by lack of joint significance of and 2 , a result consistent with the model. Reassuringly the F-test p-value does not warrant rejection at any standard confidence level.
It is also relevant to investigate how our results would change depending on the VRA coverage.
In columns (4)- (6) we run the same specifications of columns (1)- (3) on the VRA-fully covered states with stronger results than in the overall South sample. Estimates especially di er on the 33 See Grofman, Handley, and Niemi (1992, p.23). 34 Considering an average white registration rate around 80 percent (see Grofman, Handley, Niemi 1992, p. 23).
quantitative implications on the increasing part. Repeating our calculations, the two estimated e ects are now 23 5 percent at Q5 and +11 percent at Q9 for the sample of cities initially Again we detect individual but no joint significance of and 2 for the cities (the F-test p-value does not warrant rejection at any standard confidence level).
Minority representation
Our basic story holds that electoral rules a ect the ratio of minorities elected di erently. The representational ratio ( ) is the fraction of minority councilmen in a council divided by the fraction of the population that belongs to the minority and is available for our all-US cities sample in year 1980, 1990, and 2000 35 . We regress on our variable of interests, the single-district rule variable. Table 4 reports the results. The null hypothesis that the electoral rule adopted by a city has no association with the representational ratio is soundly rejected in both a 1990 cross-sectional regressions (Panel a, column 1) and in fixed-e ect regressions in which time invariant city-specific unobserved heterogeneity is accounted for (Panel b, column 1) 36 . Single-district rules substantially increase the chance of minorities to be proportionally represented at the municipal level. Recalling that the fraction of single-district seats, is defined over the [0 1] interval, our results in column (1) imply an average increase in the of the city council between 8 2 (in panel a) and 21 6 (in panel b) percent from switching from a fully at-large rule to a fully single-district rule. This is a quantitatively substantial e ect: each black or minority vote has more than 1 5 more weight in terms of electoral representation under single-district than under at-large elections 37 . Finally, let us note that the correlations presented in column (1) identify the e ect of the electoral rule on the representational ratio without the strong exclusion restriction that the fraction of the minority has an independent e ect on .
In columns (2)- (4) we provide evidence that the impact of the single-district rule on the representational ratio is actually non-monotonic in the size of the minority by looking at the e ect of the single-district variable at di erent levels of . As discussed above our model implies that the sign of the coe cient should be the highest in intermediate ranges of and the lowest when the 35 Very few cities for the all US sample present representational ratios of minorities of more than 1, indicating over-proportional representation. Even less of them are present in the South. In order to limit the role of these outliers we limit the representational ratio to be smaller than 5. 36 All panel specifications include year fixed e ects and a set of standard controls for city size (log population) and income levels (log household median income in 1990 dollars) and we apply the same clustering as Table 1 . 37 Focusing on the South produces even stronger estimates, in a range of 1 3 Sass and Pittman (2000) also provide panel data evidence on the e ect of electoral rule on minority representation reporting a representational ratio di erential of 36 percent, larger but comparable with our estimates. Our results extend to more recent data and a substantially larger sample of cities.
fraction of the minority is either very small or very large. The three ranges we employ are: (i) below the mean of ; 38 between the mean and the minimum, of the computed in Table 1 ( 
Conclusions
This paper studies the problem of minority representation in political systems where majorities can strategically manipulate electoral rules. Empirical validation of this approach comes from the experience of cities in the United States before and after the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
Before the Voting Rights Act, racial minorities were essentially disenfranchised in the US South.
Therefore, the type of electoral institutions were irrelevant in determining the level of control of the white majority: a level of control that was almost absolute. The Voting Rights Act allowed racial minorities to enter into the political arena. The white majorities reacted, within the legal boundaries of the Voting Rights Act, by changing electoral rules as to minimize expected minority influence. This evidence suggests how institutions (in this case electoral rules) evolve even rather quickly in response to changes in the environment and raises questions about empirical evidence that holds electoral institutions as exogenous. 38 The mean for the 1990 sample is 0 125 and for the panel is 0 130. since here = and μ 1 2 (1 3 )
At = 1 2 (4) holds with equality. This establishes the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 2
Define 1 = 1 and = Normalize (0) = 0 The expected utility of a pure is:
where
The probability under a single-member district system of winning type-2 districts 1 2 2 for is:
+ Then the expected utility of pure for given is:
Notice that ( ) ( ) 
Hence (5) implies that atˆ :
(1)
A risk averse will always accept at least a small amount of risk that is actuarially favorable.
Therefore, atˆ will prefer a mixed system to a pure rule.
To see this, define the number of councilmen per district and consider the problem of for =ˆ :
The expected utility of a mixed system for given is:
By using the expression in (7) and allowing to take continuous values the FOC for the problem is:
where we use the fact that Pr( ) = Pr( ) Pr( ) and condition (5) . We are interested in evaluating (8) at = :
By replacing in (9) the expression in (6) we can see that the FOC is strictly negative at = .
This is because the element in brackets in (9) is strictly negative by (6):
This excludes that will choose a pure system. Since atˆ is not the optimum and = , then a pure rule cannot be an optimum either. This implies will choose a mixed system with 6 = 0 6 = Finally, by continuity in a neighborhood ( 3 4 ) ofˆ the same must hold.
This establishes the proposition. 0.002 0.041 0.002 0.000 0.000 Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets below coefficients. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. In panel (a) and (b) standard errors are clustered at the city level for columns (4) and (5). Regressions of columns (4) and (5) include year fixed effects. No relation Ftest refers to the joint test for the null hypothesis that Frac. Minority and Frac. Minority squared are zero. For column (2) controls are: the squared log of city population and income, the fraction of population employed in manufacturing, agricolture, mining, trade, financial services, and fraction above 65 years of age. For column (3) the instruments set includes t-10 lags of frac. minority and its square and an indicator variable for Southern cities. For column (5) controls are the squared log of city population and income. The date of the VRA is 1965. Robust standard errors in brackets below coefficients. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Columns (1)-(3) employ sample of all Southern cities; (4)-(6) only cities in VRA-covered States. In these first difference specification frac. minority and its square enter in 1960 levels in order to proxy for the extension of the franchise to minorities. Robust standard errors are in brackets below coefficients. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Standard errors are clustered at the city level in Panel (b). In Panel (b) all regressions include year fixed effects and sample coverage period is 1980-2000. The representational ratio is the fraction of nonwhite councilmen in the council divided by the fraction of the population that is non-white. 
